Education International Research

# Case Study of TAFE and public vocational education in Australia

**Preliminary Report** 

Leesa Wheelahan, Gavin Moodie, Eric Lavigne and Fatima Samji

University of Toronto, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

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#### About the authors:

Eric Lavigne

Fatima Samji

Gavin Moodie

Leesa Wheelahan

#### **Education International**

Education International (EI) is the world's largest federation of unions, representing thirty million teachers and education employees across the globe. EI maintains that Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), like all education, is a basic human right. The full participation of citizens in the sustainable, social, cultural, political and economic life of their communities is facilitated by the knowledge, understanding and skills acquired though education and training. All individuals should enjoy equal access to TVET without discrimination and without the ability to pay being a barrier to their participation.

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## Introduction

TAFE, or technical and further education institutes, are the public vocational education and training institutions in Australia. Since the 1980s, TAFE has been subjected to policies that sought to position it as one 'provider' in a market populated by public and private providers. TAFE's role has been narrowed from providing further education and holistic vocationally oriented education to providing specific skills required by employers through a narrow model of competency-based training curriculum. Since the 2000s, vocational education has been subjected to sustained marketisation and privatisation policies that have seriously weakened TAFE as an institution, led to the sackings of thousands of TAFE teachers and education support workers and closures of campuses throughout Australia, and resulted in declining enrolments and reduced opportunities for students. Students' fees have risen and the range and types of programs available to them have been cut back, as Australian and state governments limit public funding to programs deemed to be 'in demand' in the labour market.

The 'social settlement' underpinning vocational education in Australia has broken. There is no longer a broad consensus between governments, employer peak bodies, unions (including teacher education unions), educational institutions and the welfare sector about the purpose of vocational education, or its role in Australian society more broadly (Schubert, Goedegebuure, & Meek, 2018; Shreeve, 2018; Wheelahan, 2015, 2016). While both sides of Australian politics are implicated in the undermining of vocational education and TAFE in Australia, the funding, quality and sustainability of vocational education and the future of TAFE have become polarising issues in Australian politics and a feature of state and federal elections

TAFE, and public vocational education, are in a parlous position. Unless governments recognise the value of TAFE as a key anchor institution of the communities they serve and fund it accordingly, public vocational education is in danger of being reduced to atomistic, just in time and just for now, narrow skills training by a fragmented population of private-for-profit providers and a residual public TAFE system.

There are precedents in Australian public policy where the provision of social goods provided by public and not-for-profit institutions have been marketised, privatised and commercialised, including through the use of public subsidies to private-for-profit companies, so that a social good becomes a predominately commercial undertaking (Gittens, 2018; Meagher & Wilson, 2015). One example is child care policy, where public subsidies were (and are) provided to for-profit providers where the concern is to maximise returns to investors (Brennan & Oloman, 2009; Woodrow & Press, 2018).¹

<sup>1</sup> These policies led to spectacular market failures such as the collapse of ABC Learning in 2008, which was a massive chain of for-profit childcare centres throughout Australia (Brennan & Oloman, 2009; Woodrow & Press, 2018) Deemed 'too big to fail', the Federal Government invested \$1100 million of public funding to keep the centres open until new arrangements could be made for their operation (Woodrow & Press, 2018, 9).



Another example is the privatisation and commercialisation of employment services to support unemployed people, where not-for-profits are forced to compete in a for-profit market with for-profit providers, resulting in very poor outcomes for unemployed people, particularly those from marginalised and disadvantaged communities and groups (Considine, Lewis, & O'Sullivan, 2011; Rexter, 2018). Perhaps the most recent example is aged care (Fine & Davidson, 2018), with reports "that six for-profit companies operate over 20 per cent of residential aged care beds in Australia" (Wade, 2018). Widespread reports of lack of appropriate care and abuse have led the current Federal conservative government to establish a Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety.<sup>2</sup> The National Disability Insurance Scheme is still in its infancy, but there are already calls to have the disability sector included in the Aged Care Royal Commission.<sup>3</sup>

There are some signs that the tide may be turning. For example, the Australian Labor Party has promised that if elected in the 2019 federal election it will institute a 'once in a generation review' of tertiary education, including TAFE. It has argued that it will reinvest in TAFE. The Victorian Labor government is reinvesting in TAFE, and has recently signed an enterprise agreement with the Australian Education Union that promises substantial pay increases for teachers, reintroduces support for teachers to undertake higher level teaching qualifications so they can be expert teachers as well as industry experts, and has designated qualifications for specific industries that will be exempt of student fees. The Queensland Labor government has also promised fee relief. However, we argue that these steps, while positive and well overdue, are not sufficient to re-establish TAFE as the anchor of the vocational education system in Australia. The concluding chapter offers specific policy suggestions that are premised on TAFE as the anchor of the vocational education system, where funding is for institutions that are trusted to work with their local communities and employers to develop provision that meets these needs. This is in contrast to state or federal governments 'picking winners' by determining programs that are fee exempt, while others still have high fees. In other words, we argue that TAFEs should be funded, rather than funding tied to programs.

This report outlines the position of vocational education and TAFE in Australia. It is part of a broader project commissioned by Education International, which is the international federation of teacher education unions. The aim of the project is to research how technical and vocational education and training or TVET can contribute to social justice, social inclusion, and sustainable development in different countries in the world. In 2016, Education International published the first report in this project which used the concept of 'productive capabilities' to explore the role that TVET could play in supporting social justice (Wheelahan & Moodie, 2016). This report is part of the second stage of the project, which analyses TVET in different kinds of systems to understand how productive capabilities could be applied in different countries. The in-depth case studies in this project are Australia, Cote D'Ivoire, England, and Taiwan. The Australian case study provides a salutary and sobering illustration of the impact of marketisation and privatisation policies on public

See: https://agedcare.health.gov.au/royal-commission-into-aged-care-quality-and-safety

<sup>3</sup> See: https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/am/push-for-aged-care-royal-commission-to-cover-disability-sector/10262104

vocational education and public vocational education institutions. It provides an example of what *not* to do.

The aim of this report is not just to document the ways in which TAFE and public vocational education have been undermined, demonised and diminished. It also aims to contribute to a discussion about the roles that TAFE *could* play if it were appropriately funded and supported. We argue that the notion of 'productive capabilities' can provide a foundation for conceptualising the role of TAFEs in supporting individuals to contribute to their families, communities and occupations, and in doing so, explain how vocational education can support sustainable, socially just and inclusive societies (Moodie, 2012; Moodie, Fredman, Bexley, & Wheelahan, 2013; Wheelahan, Buchanan, & Yu, 2015; Wheelahan & Moodie, 2016). Productive capabilities draws on the capabilities framework first developed by the economist and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1999) and the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2000). Its key concerns are social justice and ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to flourish and realise their aspirations. It has become a very influential framework used to evaluate social policy in a broad range of fields (Robeyns, 2016).

Productive capabilities can provide a foundation for considering the purposes of vocational education, the nature of provision and curriculum, and the types of institutions that are needed. We argue that a new social settlement is needed in vocational education in Australia. The new social settlement would be based on the following four features:

- In which the purpose of vocational education is to prepare individuals for a broad *occupation or vocational stream* rather than narrowly defined jobs and so they can contribute to their families and communities;
- Which is based on a curriculum where productive capabilities provides
  the model for the development, elaboration and codification of knowledge
  and skills. This requires a move away from narrow competency-based
  training models of curriculum to holistic vocational education in which the
  educational purposes of vocational education are just as important as its
  specifically vocational purposes;
- In which knowledge and skills and curriculum are developed, supported and enabled by TAFEs as the anchor institution that support their local communities and regional economic and social development; and,
- In TAFEs that are staffed by well-resourced and appropriately qualified education support staff and teachers who are expert teachers as well as industry experts, who can research and develop curriculum that supports students with the capabilities they need for their future careers, and who have a repertoire of teaching and learning strategies that support all students to learn, including the most disadvantaged.

The first part of this paper explains the development of vocational education policy in Australia and how vocational education and TAFE arrived at its current parlous state. This



includes the interconnection between funding and marketisation policies, and policies that resulted in narrow, instrumental models of competency-based training curriculum. This is followed by an outline of the findings of a survey we implemented of Australian TAFE teachers, education support staff, and others with an interest in public vocational education in Australia and their experience of these policies. The paper then explores what vocational education could look like in Australia if it were underpinned by strong public TAFE institutes with well-resourced and qualified teachers. It uses the capabilities approach to present a broad framework for vocational education policy and the role of TAFEs, and productive capabilities to discuss the nature of qualifications, vocations and vocational streams.

# Vocational education policy in Australia

The current policies in vocational education have their origins in the 1980s, when both sides of politics embraced neoliberal 'New Public Management' theories in which the public sector is viewed with suspicion and accused of acting in its own interests and not that of its 'customers'. The vision of society moved from one where society is supported by market, to one where society is a market and the point of policy is to support the market (Emy & Hughes, 1988; Pusey, 1991; Yeatman, 2017a). The role of government is redefined in this vision of the market society as one which 'steers' the economy and society through the operation of markets, rather than through direct provision of services. This resulted in the privatisation and marketisation of many social services (Yeatman, 2017b). In this vision, markets are regarded as the best and most effective way to distribute access to social services because they putatively put 'choice' in the hands of individuals and force public institutions to compete in markets with private corporations and adopt the practices of the private sector.

The vision and purpose of all sectors of education, particularly vocational education, were reshaped to be aligned with the needs of the economy (Marginson, 1997). The point of education was to produce workers with the 'right' knowledge and skills, or 'human capital', for the economy. In vocational education, this resulted in the imposition of narrow 'competency-based training' models of curriculum, in which the outcomes of education are aligned with specific workplace tasks, roles and responsibilities.

The previous social settlement in vocational education underpinned by the Kangan Committee of 1974 was abandoned. This established TAFE as a national sector of tertiary education (Kangan, 1974). TAFE's role was defined broadly as providing vocationally oriented, holistic education rather than narrow labour force planning. For example, the Kangan Committee explains that the two guidelines that guided its deliberations were that:

- (a) Recurrent opportunities for technical and further education should be available to people of all ages regardless of minimum formal educational entry requirements or of current employment status. Opportunities throughout life for recurrent education should give priority to the needs of the individual as a person and to his or her development as a member of society, including the development of non vocational and social skills that affect personality.
- (b) The broader the approach in technical and further education the more the likelihood of creating an environment in which self motivated individuals can reach their vocational goals and in which motivation may be regenerated in people who have lost it. (Kangan, 1974, xvii)



The Kangan settlement was abandoned in the 1980s. Government policies for vocational education in the 1980s and 1990s had three overarching policies: to create an 'industry-led' system through the imposition of competency-based training models of curriculum aligned with specific requirements of the workplace; to create a national system of vocational education qualifications that were nationally portable, so that those with qualifications in one state could get them recognised in another; and finally, to create a market in vocational education in which TAFE was recast as one interchangeable provider in a market (Wheelahan, 2003).

A second wave of policy reforms were implemented in the 2000s with government created markets in vocational education that provided private providers with unprecedented access to public funding and to publicly underwritten student loans. While Australian governments have sought to increase 'contestability' in public vocational education beginning in 1999, these efforts accelerated during the late 2000s, when the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments signed successive agreements which gave private providers untrammelled access to public funding. This occurred through two main mechanisms: the first was through a type of voucher in which students could go to a public or private institution and the public subsidy would follow them. The second was through the provision of income-contingent loans for diplomas and higher level qualifications, first for full-fee provision, and then for publicly funded provision (Burke, 2018).

#### Policy in other sectors of education

In understanding the nature of the market that was established in Australia and TAFE's positioning within it, it is important to understand what was happening in the higher education and schools sectors of education because of the impact of these developments on TAFE. Governments also sought to increase marketisation in higher education through the implementation of the 'demand-driven system' in higher education in 2009, which meant that universities could admit as many students to under-graduate places as they could accommodate, and receive public funding for those places (Bradley, 2008). In this case, public funding for higher education places was only available for public universities while notfor-profit or private providers were not granted access. Students at non-university providers could access loans to pay for their fees, which were full fees, and not publicly subsidised places. By this stage, TAFE had started offering degrees in response for demands for higher qualifications in many of the occupations traditionally associated with vocational education, and to support demands from the community for access to higher level qualifications (Wheelahan, Moodie, Billett, & Kelly, 2009). However, instead of being designated as public institutions implementing public policy objectives through offering this provision, TAFE was designated as a private provider and could not access publicly funded places for its degrees. The demand driven system was in place for almost 10 years until it was effectively frozen by the conservative government at the beginning of 2018 (Norton, 2018).

Components of, or entire, vocational education qualifications were offered as part of the senior school certificates from the 1990s and this accelerated in the 2000s (Smith, 2004) so by the end of the first decade in the 2000s most schools offered at least some 'VET in schools' and about half or all students undertaking the senior school certificates were taking at least some VET (Nguyen, 2013). Schools offering vocational education sometimes worked with TAFEs to deliver this provision, but in other cases, either became registered training organisations so they could offer (and be paid for) this provision, or worked with private providers to offer this provision because they charged less than TAFE.

Consequently, TAFE faced competition within the vocational education sector from each other, but mostly from for-profit providers. They were also competing with universities at the higher levels of their provision but were treated as private providers, and with schools at the lower end where they were often treated as too expensive. TAFE could not (and cannot) win in any of these markets.

#### **Policy outcomes**

The result of these reforms has been the creation of a fragmented system of narrow competency-based qualifications that do not serve their purposes; a fragmented system of providers in a for profit market; the decimation of TAFE; and, a crisis in the quality of and legitimacy of the vocational education system.

#### **Competency-based training**

The mandated model of provision in vocational education in Australia is a narrow notion of competency-based training (CBT). Vocational education qualifications are comprised of units of competency that are part of 'training packages', and there are different training packages for different industries and for different occupations within those industries. Units of competency are based on existing workplace tasks, roles or requirements. They are backward looking qualifications that take current workplace practices as the basis for preparing students for the future, and do not provide students with sufficient access to the theoretical basis of practice (Wheelahan, 2012).

They also don't work. CBT was meant to align vocational education with Australia's economic policy objectives, and the way this would occur was through using CBT to directly align the outcomes of training with the requirements of specific occupations. In 2017, only 32% of publicly funded vocational education graduates who completed their studies in 2017 were in the occupation directly associated with their qualification (NCVER 2017b, Table 13). Nor has vocational education really supported occupational progression in the labour market. Some 18.2% of government funded VET graduates in 2016 reported

<sup>4</sup> In most cases, this was by students undertaking just a small component of vocational education as part their senior school certificates. Those students undertaking substantial components of vocational education as part of their senior school certificates were more likely to come from disadvantaged backgrounds (Polesel, 2010).



that they were employed at a higher skill level after training, while only 44% of VET graduates who were unemployed prior to training reported that they were employed after training (NCVER 2017a: Table 17).

#### A fragmented system, scandals and crises

The imposition of CBT has resulted in a fragmented and inefficient system. There are thousands of vocational education qualifications (called training packages) that are developed and not used. The Commonwealth Department of Industry (2014: 21-22) reports that:

Currently, only a small proportion of publicly funded qualifications have the majority of enrolments, with a significant proportion of qualifications having very few, or no publicly funded enrolments. For example, of the 3909 qualifications publicly delivered from 2002 to 2013, 395 (10 per cent) had less than 10 enrolments and 894 (23 per cent) had less than 50 enrolments over that period.<sup>5</sup>

There are about 3000 training products (training packages and accredited courses) on the national VET register (Department of Industry, 2014: 21-22). This is a rigid and expensive system based on inefficiencies and fragmentation. Most courses do not meet the economies of scale test, and millions are spent developing and maintaining training packages that are not used.

The fragmentation of qualifications is matched by the fragmentation of providers. There were over 4600 active registered training providers in Australia in 2016. The biggest 100 providers (about 2% of providers) in 2013 taught about 78% of publicly funded provision. In 2013, only 96 providers had more than 100 equivalent fulltime students (EFT) (NCVER 2014: derived from Table 1). Beddie, Hargreaves and Atkinson (2017, 10) explain that 18% of qualifications with enrolments of more than 1000 students accounted for over 90% of all enrolments in 2015. Australia has had to construct a complex and expensive regulatory framework to police the activities of thousands of providers, even though a tiny minority deliver most provision.

The combined impact of voucher and income-contingent loans has led to government disinvestment in vocational education, and massive cost-shifting to students who are saddled with large debts, often for qualifications that are worthless (Ross, 2017). Scandals and crises have wracked the vocational education sector, as for-profit providers have made monstrous profits. Reviews by the Australian Skills Quality Authority, the body with oversight of quality in VET, have found serious and far-reaching problems in the security industry, the equine industry, the early childhood and the aged care industries. The Commonwealth Department of Education and Training (2016: 24) reports unethical

6 See: <a href="http://training.gov.au/Reports/RtoTypes">http://training.gov.au/Reports/RtoTypes</a>

8 See Australian Skills Quality Authority (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2015).

<sup>5</sup> It is important to understand what the Department of Industry is saying here. Some 10% of qualifications had less than 10 enrolments, and 23% had less than 50 enrolments in Australia from 2002 – 2013!

NCVER has not published a more recent publication of providers of publicly funded vocational education since 2104.

provider practices through the use of brokers and agents, which included, for example, "a proliferation of unethical actions by a small number of providers offering items such as iPads, cash and vouchers to prospective students as inducements to enrol in a course and request VET FEE-HELP".

The emphasis has been on those private providers who have broken the rules and been deregistered, often after accruing millions of dollars in profit. Fraud and waste has come to be synonymous with vocational education. However, while important, this ignores the private providers who have made huge profits by operating within rules, and accruing rates of profit that much higher than the average for Australian companies (Yu & Oliver, 2015a, 2015b). For example, Burke (2018, 1) explains that each and every attempt to 'open' the market to private providers through greater contestability "was associated with waste and fraud" and that "[t]he rapid extension of funding to for-profit providers led to a decline in quality, fraud and waste" (p.2).

The student loans scheme provided private providers with an opportunity to write their own cheques. An article in one of Australia's daily newspapers described the vocational education as "the biggest get-rich quick scheme in Australia" (Bachelard, Cook, & Knott, 2015). Student loans for diplomas and advanced diplomas were \$26 million in 2009 and rose to over \$2.9 billion in 2015 (Department of Education and Training, 2016: 15). Saccaro and Wright (2018, 2) explain that the VET FEE-HELP scheme that provided income contingent loans for publicly and privately funded diplomas "resulted in a shift of funding for higher level VET qualifications from states to individuals and a massive windfall for private providers." Loans were taken disproportionately by students from disadvantaged backgrounds. This loans scheme has been discontinued and replaced with a new loans scheme that tightly restricts the loans that students can obtain for programs that are tied to labour market priorities as determined by state governments, or they can take commercial loans (Warbuton, 2017). Students who can afford to go to university, and who are successful in being offered a place, are able to pursue qualifications that reflect their interests and aspirations, while VET students cannot.

In a for profit market, the key point is to make profits. The problem was, as Spierings (2015: 164) explains, that vocational education was reconceptualised "as a service commodity offered within a competitive market, rather than an educational good negotiated and constructed between students, teachers and industry". This has perverted the purpose of vocational education and led to a collapse in trust in the confidence of the system and its qualifications. Moreover, as he explains:

"The experiment in the 'marketisation' of vocational education developed across a like-minded circle of consultants, advisers and public servants proceeding without an electoral mandate and without adequate public debate, scrutiny or transparency. There has been no accountability for the public dollars lost and little apology for the careers that have advanced despite highly flawed implementation and poor outcomes." (Spierings, 2015: 169)



Greater marketisation has led to more regulation, not less. The crisis of quality and confidence in vocational education has led to greater levels regulation as government and the Australian Skills Quality Authority have sought to stamp out bad behaviour, usually after it has happened. This has led to a significant regulatory burden on institutions and on teachers and education support and administrative staff, and an escalation in the paperwork that must be completed to be compliant with regulatory requirements.

### Government disinvestment in publicly funded vocational education

The creation of the market has led to government disinvestment in vocational education and the decimation of TAFE as the public vocational education institution in Australia. Figure 1 shows the change in government funding for each hour of publicly funded training since 2008. We have chosen 2008 as the year of comparison because this is the year in which the first National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development was signed between the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments, which implemented the first of the contestability reforms through implementing a voucher up to certificate III (Council of Australian Governments, 2008). 2008 was also the year that the Victorian government began the process of 'full contestability' for higher level vocational education qualifications (Government of Victoria, 2008).




Figure 1. Percentage change in funding per hour of training, 2008 compared to 2017

Source: Derived from Table 5A.2 Part B, Chapter 5, Attachment Productivity Commission (2018)

Overall, funding for each hour of publicly funded training dropped by 12.64% from 2008 to 2016. One of the greatest drops was in Victoria, where funding declined by 29.23% in that time, followed by Queensland, where funding dropped by 26.54% in that time (See Appendix 1 for more information which shows funding per hour of training for each state and territory for each year 2008 – 2016, and the percentage change in funding since 2008) (Productivity Commission, 2018 derived from Table 5A.2 Part B, Chapter 5). New South Wales appears to be an outlier with having an increased funding rate per hour, but this is only because enrolments in public vocational education collapsed in 2015, leading to an artificially high funding rate for New South Wales in 2015 and 2016.

#### **Growth of private providers and impact on TAFE**

The for-profit market has resulted in a dramatic shift to for-profit providers, and in more recent years, to a collapse in the number of training hours. We are focusing on the number of training hours rather than the number of students, because government funding is tied to hours of training. Figure 2 shows the change in publicly funded hours of provision from 2008 to 2017. There was dramatic increase in publicly funded hours from 2008 to 2013 and 2014 coinciding with the peak of the loans scheme, followed by a decline in publicly funded hours since that time. Overall, in 2017, publicly funded hours of provision were similar to what they were in 2008, except that TAFE's share had declined so that there has been a dramatic redistribution of hours to private providers in that time.




Figure 2. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Australia

TAFEs TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

Other registered providers, mainly private providers

Source: Derived from NCVER (2018: Table 12)



Moreover, TAFE's provision has fallen dramatically. While publicly funded training hours in Australia grew by a mere 6.3% from 2008 to 2017, TAFE was delivering 25.6% fewer publicly funded hours of provision in 2017 than it was in 2008. In contrast, private providers were delivering 199% more hours (see Appendix 2 for detailed analysis of hours by provider type in Australia). This varies widely by state. For example in Victoria in 2008, TAFE's share of publicly funded hours was 76.4%, while it was 49.5% in 2017, having recovered somewhat from its nadir in 2014 where it had only 36.6% of publicly funded hours. Overall, TAFE's publicly funded hours in Victoria fell by 17.5% from 2008 to 2017, while publicly funded hours delivered by private providers rose by 276% in that time (see Appendix 4 for a full analysis). The decline of TAFE in Queensland is even more alarming. In 2008 TAFE's share of publicly funded hours was 82.1%, while it was 32.4% in 2017 (after falling to 29.8% in 2016). Publicly funded hours in TAFE fell by 48.4% in Queensland in that time, while they rose by 430.8% in private providers, who delivered 65.3% of publicly funded hours in 2017 (see Appendix 5 for a full analysis). In New South Wales, TAFE still delivers 74.3% of publicly funded training hours, but the number of hours it delivers has declined by 27.4% from 2008 to 2017 (after falling by 36% from 2008 to 2015), while the number of hours delivered by private providers rose by 111.1% in that time. However, the system in New South Wales as a whole has contracted, and it now delivers 15% fewer hours of training in 2017 than it did in 2008 (see Appendix 3 for a full analysis). Figure 3 shows that New South Wales now has a smaller system than Victoria, despite being a larger state, and has had a smaller system than Victoria since 2011 (see Appendix 1 for a full analysis).




Figure 3. Percentage share of publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours) by state/territory

<sup>9</sup> This increase of 276% for private providers in Victoria from 2008 – 2017 looks modest in comparison to previous increases. In 2014, private providers' number of publicly funded hours of training had risen by 705.6% compared to 2008.

#### **Demand driven system in higher education**

The other factor affecting declining enrolments in TAFE and in vocational education overall, has been the demand driven system in higher education. Figure 5 shows the number of domestic under-graduate students Equivalent Fulltime Student Load (EFTSL) in higher education from 2008 to 2009, while Figure 5 shows that domestic under-graduate EFTSL grew by 34% from 2008 until 2016, using 2008 as the comparator year (see Table 6 for a detailed analysis). This is compared to a 6.3% increase in publicly funded hours in vocational education in that time. 10 We are not necessarily blaming the demand driven system for the decline in provision in vocational education, because it is clear that the vocational education market and competition with private providers has been the key factor. Moreover, the demand driven system has the benefit of opening higher education places to students from disadvantaged backgrounds who have been traditionally excluded. The problem is the lack of coherence in tertiary education policy in Australia in which there are not consistent funding arrangements for qualifications that are offered in both higher and vocational education institutions (such as diplomas, advanced diplomas, associate degrees and degrees), and the exclusion of TAFE from access to publicly funded under-graduate student places.




Figure 4. Domestic undergraduate student load (EFTSL) 2008-2016

Source: Department Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010) Students 2009 full year, <a href="http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx">http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx</a>
Table 4.2: Actual student load (EFTSL) for all domestic students by State, higher education provider and broad level of course, full year, 2009, and corresponding tables for subsequent years.

<sup>10</sup> EFTSL refers to funded provision in higher education, and so is comparable to publicly funded hours in vocational education. These data also include students attending under-graduate programs in non-university providers and private universities, however, their numbers overall are very small, accounting for about 3.6% of EFTs enrolled in bachelor degrees in 2016 (Department of Education and Training, 2017, derived from Table 4.2).






Figure 5. Pecentage change in EFTSL for all domestic u/g students in higher education from 2008 – 2016, with 2008 as the comparator year

Source: Department Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010) Students 2009 full year, http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx
Table 4.2: Actual student load (EFTSL) for all domestic students by State, higher education provider and broad level of course, full year, 2009, and corresponding tables for subsequent years.

#### **Consequences of policies on TAFE**

The results of these marketisation policies combined with the consequences of the demanddriven system in higher education have been twofold. First, thousands of TAFE teachers and education support staff have been sacked, campuses have closed, student services have been defunded, and capacity and institutional memory has been lost.

Victoria offers an example of the devastating impact of deregulation and marketisation on TAFE. In 2009, TAFEs were suddenly required to compete with private-for-profit providers and this escalated in the ensuing years. Private providers were able to cherry pick programs that were cheap to offer in high volume, leaving the expensive programs that required complex equipment, specialist spaces and high cost materials to TAFE. Prior to this TAFE was able to offer a mix of programs that cross-subsidised each other, thus making the costs accessible to all students. Consequently, TAFE's share of publicly funded students declined dramatically, and it was left responsible for expensive provision. Not only did the number of students decline, but funding per student also declined. Unlike private providers, TAFEs also offered library facilities and student support services to support students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and they worked with local communities, local councils and local industries to ensure that education and training provided access and scaffolded support to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The first to be sacked as a result of deregulation and marketisation were education support staff who provided these services,

and other administrative staff deemed not essential to the delivery of courses. Many teachers also lost their jobs. Meanwhile private providers continued to make monstrous profits by delivering high volume cheap-to-run programs without the same obligations to support students or their communities, or to employ qualified teachers and education support staff.

Victoria's experience was repeated in other states. For example, more than one third of the workforce in TAFE New South Wales have lost their jobs (Manning, 2016). Once this capacity is lost, it is very difficult to retrieve it or rebuild it. And, in particular, it will take a long time to rebuild the connections and social networks between TAFE and the communities it serves.

CBT contributes to a market based on disaggregated skills. It isn't possible to tinker with just one aspect of the system. CBT and training packages are fatally flawed, and they underpin and facilitate a training system that is fragmented, inefficient and ineffective and a market that is riddled by scandals and rorts. And this policy combination has undermined and seriously weakened the public TAFE system. We need a new system with new qualifications that prepare people for the future. Rather than focus on workplace tasks and roles, vocational education qualifications need to support individuals to develop the knowledge, skills and attributes to be creative and innovative at work, support their educational and occupational careers, and help them to support their families and communities. Such an approach is simply inconceivable in the Australian VET system of today and fundamental change is required to ensure its future.



# Experiences of vocational education in Australia

We thought it was important to gain the perspectives of those directly involved with public vocational education in Australia, and this was achieved through a survey in which 898 people participated. It was important to provide members of the Australian Education Union, students and others invested in public vocational education with an opportunity to give us their thoughts on the current state of their system, how well it was doing, and areas where it could be improved. A variety of people responded to the survey, including TAFE teachers, education support staff, students, public servants and others. The survey was distributed by the Australian Education Union to its members, and the survey was also distributed by the 'Stop TAFE Cuts' campaign. Table 1 shows the occupations of those who participated in the survey.

Table 1. participants by occupation - Australian survey

| Occupation                             | %     |
|--|-------|
| Employed government %                  | 6.9   |
| Employed private vocational education% | 0.9   |
| Employed private university %          | 1.3   |
| Employed public vocational education % | 56.5  |
| Employed public university %           | 1.8   |
| Employed by a union %                  | 1.1   |
| Student %                              | 14.4  |
| Did not respond %                      | 17.1  |
| All responses %                        | 100.0 |

This survey was designed to garner the views of those who chose to participate, on the topics on which they chose to comment. So while this is not a statistically representative survey (like surveys conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics), it nonetheless reports on the views of a large number of people who are committed to the public vocational education system. Of the 898 responses to the survey, about 67% of all participants completed all aspects of the survey. We have included all participants' responses when reporting on the views on particular issues, rather than limit our reporting to the 67% who completed all questions. This is because we were interested in whatever thoughts they had about the system, so we did not compel them to complete all questions to complete the survey. The survey consisted of sets of closed questions and open-ended comments on different topics.

<sup>11</sup> We also conducted the same survey in England and Taiwan, and intend to conduct it in Cote D'Ivoire. The comparative outcomes of the survey will be included in the final report of this project in 2019.

<sup>12</sup> See: https://www.stoptafecuts.com.au/

#### **Goals of vocational education**

We asked participants to rank the three most important goals of vocational education. All 898 participants completed this question and the results are presented in Figure 6. Nearly half (47%) of the participant selected preparing students for their roles as workers, which was closely followed by developing students as active citizens (42.2%). Social justice objectives such as meeting the educational needs of disadvantaged communities (21%) and supporting individuals from disadvantaged communities to get good jobs (20%) also ranked highly, as did meeting employers current needs (20.3%). Participants have a broader and more holistic view of the most important goals of vocational education compared to policy which narrowly emphasises skills needed for particular occupations, where social justice is defined by labour force participation rather than broader roles in preparing citizens. For example, one participant said that vocational education had broader purposes beyond preparing individuals for specific occupations because: "we live in a society, not an economy". Another explained that: "Vocational education is a passport for working class and marginalised people to access the labour market, improve their life trajectory, become role models in their own communities and change the world we live in." This notion was endorsed by another who explained that: "People's participation in society beyond 'work' is the only way we can hope to have a functioning economy and society." Another contrasted these broader objectives to the current narrow focus on competencies: "It is important that vocational education be more than just ticking off a checklist of competencies – we are more than the sum of our vocational skills".




Figure 6. Ranked 3 most important goals of vocational education

While participants were able to articulate the three most important goals of vocational education when asked to do so, they also clearly felt that vocational education had a broad range of goals, all of which mattered. We wanted to get participants views on these goals as well as the extent to which vocational education was able to achieve those



goals, and the extent to which the necessary resources were available to achieve those goals. Figure 7 illustrates participants' perceptions on the goals they thought vocational education should have, the extent to which vocational education has been able to achieve these goals, and the extent to which the system was adequately resourced to achieve those goals.




Figure 7. Vocational education goals: importance, achievement and resources

Participants clearly regard vocational education as having a range of goals, and that the mission of vocational education is complex and multifaceted. One participant explained: "I see *all* of these goals as critically important for the future of society", while another said "All of these are essential in developing independent, strong, future focused people stepping out into the work force". Many of the comments reinforced the particular role that vocational education has in supporting people from low socio-economic backgrounds and other disadvantaged backgrounds in accessing, and succeeding in, education: "these are extremely important goals as without TAFE courses the opportunity or the confidence for people from low socio economic and disadvantaged backgrounds to progress to higher levels of study or higher levels of jobs wouldn't happen". One participant explained that vocational education: "...is a critical pathway out of disadvantage and vulnerability, into employability and independence – especially for those who have disengaged with mainstream education due to disruption caused by family breakdown, physical or mental health issues, cognitive impairment etc".

# Extent to which vocational education's goals are achieved

Figure 7 shows that participants expressed moderate agreement with statements that vocational education was successful in achieving these goals, but much disagreement with statements that vocational education had the resources it needed to achieve these goals. This implies that vocational education is moderately successful in meeting these goals *despite* the lack of resources. For example, one participant explained: "Vocational education attempts all these things but works with insufficient resources so achieves only a moderate level of success". Many participants explained that the burden of achieving these goals has fallen to under-resourced teachers in under-resourced TAFEs: "The only thing holding it up is dedicated staff who are exhausted", while another explained that: "The TAFE sector has been savaged in Australia. We are struggling to keep good staff". And:

TAFEs are underfunded. Teachers need to wear many hats (e.g. marketing, recruitment, paper work, secretarial work, ...) . At times these hats mean that the proper focus cannot be placed on teaching. Teachers work many hours to complete paperwork and courses for the benefit of auditors not students.

Some comments pointed to the outcomes for TAFE because of the transfer of funds to the private-for-profit sector, as well as the decline in funding overall. For example:

The vocational system in Australia has been drastically undermined by government policy and action – including massive funds shift to the private sector creating serious failure of the training [system] and exploitation of students and creation of massive debt imposts which students cannot repay.

And: "the erosion of funding for vocational education has seen a decline in the success of the sector. there are only so many ways we can cut the cloth, when there just isn't enough cloth some parts are left bare".

Others pointed to the casualisation of the TAFE teaching workforce and the pressure on casuals as a direct result. For example, one participant argued that the teaching workforce in TAFE "is casualised to such a large extent, the services are not holistic as they rely on 'good will'. Teachers and sessional teachers are poorly paid and [the] work load is enormous." One participant pointed to the direct impact this had on students: "The casualisation of the workforce means less support for students from teachers who aren't always available". Another explained that the: "TAFE budget and resourcing has been gutted over the last 5 – 10 years. Recently outreach services supporting disadvantaged communities were dissolved". One pointed to course closures and campus closures as a problem for disadvantaged communities, which meant that students had to travel long distances to access the same courses they could access locally.



A consistent theme coming through many of the open-ended comments was the burden of the compliance and accountability frameworks, which teachers argued detracted from their time and ability to teach. For example in one representative comment, one participant explained: "Compliance dominates the teaching and assessing, quality teaching doesn't seem valued". Another explained that: "Our TAFE teachers are increasingly spending their time, not preparing for the delivery of their courses but filling in paperwork for compliance, administrative duties and marketing their courses". One teacher expressed great frustration saying:

We have lost all of our admin staff, and lecturers are left to pick up the pieces. We have lost our psychologists, and students are not receiving the support they need. Our computer systems are broken. Lecturers are trying to keep things together with very little support. Most of us are on contracts and still not permanent after all of these years of working at TAFE.

# Working conditions for teachers and education support staff

Reports of working conditions for TAFE teachers and education support workers were dire. Some 621 individuals responded to the questions about conditions for teaching staff, while 594 responded to the questions about conditions for education support staff. Responses to these questions are illustrated in Figure 8. Using a 5 point scale, participants in the survey clearly do not think teachers and education support workers are valued, that they have the resources they need to do their jobs, that they have sufficient professional development opportunities, or that they have the capacity to and autonomy needed to shape their jobs. Moreover, most participants disagreed that there were sufficient permanent contracts for either teachers or education support workers.

The open-ended comments provided insights into the conditions in which teachers and education support workers work. On participant situated the working conditions in TAFE in the broader policy environment in this way: "The problems and issues regarding support for VE teachers are many and varied. Contestability and the corporatisation of TAFE and education generally drive and provide the environment in which the problems fester". Another explained the impact on students:

We have lost far too many experienced VE teachers over the past 10 years in Australia. The loss of experience, knowledge and skill in teaching diverse student groups is serious and affects the quality of education possible to provide. Newer less experienced teaching staff do not have the mentors and models from whom they can learn.

#### Yet another explained:

In the sub-department I work in, there is not one permanent teacher employed, which means there is no job security at all, and teachers lack the benefits of regular employment such as sick leave and holiday pay. This situation does promote quality teaching and adds huge unnecessary stress on staff. It also leads to high staff turnover which impacts TAFE outcomes.



Figure 8. Perceptions of working conditions for TAFE teachers and education support staff

The theme of lack of permanent contracts for teachers was a recurring one, which is illustrated by this comment:

Having too many teachers on temporary contracts without certainty of employment demeans the teacher and devalues the profession. If society wants good educational outcomes, society must prioritise this goal, and ensure adequate resourcing, by paying teachers well, and by offering them permanency and a defined career path.

Comments about conditions for education support staff were similar. However, in this case, the cutbacks in some TAFEs had been so far reaching that not many of these roles remain. For example, one participant explained that "I have no knowledge of any education support workers employed in my institution", while another said "In my workplace (TAFE) there are only a few people in these roles, so not well resourced or supported", while another explained that "The majority are on short term contracts or are employed on a sessional basis". And, "Most are on short-term contracts because their positions are driven by government contract funding. Wages are generally low". There were many comments like this. Yet, the work of education support staff are highly valued:



"The permanent staff that have resigned and moved on have been replaced by sessional staff. These staff are incredible at their jobs, and are an invaluable resource". Another explained that: "The situation for education support workers is even more distressing and pathetic. These people underpin what we do in our teaching work and the way they're treated is like slaves".

#### Government support, funding, quality and status

Most participants disagreed that vocational education was valued either by government. Some 607 participants responded to these questions, and they were asked to agree or disagree with a range of statements on a 5 point scale. Figure 9 shows that there was substantial disagreement with statements that TAFEs were adequately funded or that they had stable funding; that TAFEs were sufficiently included on the one hand, or had sufficient autonomy to carry out their mission, or finally, that TAFE was valued by government.




Figure 9. Perceptions of government's support for vocational education

As is shown in Figure 10, perceptions about lack of government support for vocational education are combined with strong perceptions that standards are under pressure;<sup>13</sup> perceptions that quality and standards were not good;<sup>14</sup> and perhaps unsurprisingly, that

<sup>13</sup> The question respondents were asked to respond to was: "Quality and standards of vocational education qualifications are under pressure" using a 5 point scale with 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither disagree nor agree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree.

<sup>14</sup> The questions respondents were asked to respond to was: "Quality and standards of vocational education qualifications are good" using the above scale.

vocational education was not as valued as universities. <sup>15</sup> Participants were asked whether vocational education was valued in Australia, and here participants thought that, on the whole, it wasn't. One participant was representative of many others saying:

I witnessed the mass exodus (voluntary and involuntary) of teachers fighting to maintain the quality and standard of the VET qualifications they were providing as the funding to TAFE was slashed. Some gave up and refused to be a part of trying to provide an excellent education with very limited resources. Others stayed and are still fighting to maintain the quality and standards of the education, but I fear it is a losing battle.




Figure 10. Perceptions of vocational education's status and quality

These findings are perhaps not surprising given the constant scandals and rorts that are now part of the mainstream media in Australia. When asked if they had any further comments about these issues and challenges facing vocational education more broadly, participants persistently wrote about the problems arising from the vocational education market in which private providers had access to public funding or could enrol students taking out large income-contingent loans. One representative comment is as follows:

Public vocational education institutions have been undermined by unscrupulous private registered training organisations (RTOs) over the past few years. They have left thousands of students in limbo and with debts. The competition from these RTOs have caused a reduction in funding for public TAFEs from successive governments who ignored the

<sup>15</sup> The questions respondents were asked to respond to was: "Vocational education is as strongly valued as university in my country" using the above scale.



### RTO corruption and dodgy delivery of courses. Now public TAFES are being punished with more regulation and compliance.

Vocational education is always under pressure when compared to universities because the occupations for which vocational education prepares graduates is lower status compared to the professional destinations of many occupations trained by universities. This is the case in most countries, and while vocational education can be higher or lower in status in different systems, it is usually lower in status than universities (Wheelahan & Moodie, 2016). However, when public vocational education institutions such as TAFE are in a market where they must compete with private-for-profit providers in a for-profit market, they are placed in an invidious position compared to Australian universities which do not have to compete with for-profit providers for access to publicly funded places. In one typical comment, a participant explained:

Contestable funding [in vocational education] and uncapped uni places have been a disaster for TAFE in Australia... We have ruined a world class vocational education system in the name of neoliberal ideology. It fills me with despair. I hope we can fix it, and that it is not too late. What a disaster.

Overall, the results from the survey show a system in crisis, as experienced by those who work within it. It is characterised by narrow competency-based curriculum that does not meet its own goals, let alone prepare students for a career and for citizenship; a corrupt market; declining standards and legitimacy; declining enrolments; increased regulation and compliance requirements; and, an increasingly casualised and overworked workforce, including teachers and education support workers. However, despite this, teachers and education support workers are optimistic for what vocational education can and should do. This is demonstrated in the broad social goals that they support, that emphasise social justice as well as preparing students for their working lives. In the final section of this report, we turn to what a high quality, high trusted vocational education system might look like, using the notion of productive capabilities as the framework.

# What would a strong vocational education system look like?

Fundamental changes to vocational education are needed in Australia if it is:

- To build a high trust system that produces education and qualifications that individuals and employers, unions and the community have reason to value;
- To better prepare individuals for the labour market now and in the future, and to prepare individuals for progression within their occupations and for lifelong learning;
- To support better connections between qualifications and the labour market through vocations and vocational streams;
- Which are founded on TAFE as the trusted anchor institution that works with industry bodies, employers, unions, and governments, and non-government organisations and not-for-profits that support vulnerable communities;
- That supports TAFE to support its local communities and industries, and contribute to innovation, sustainable social and economic development, and tolerant and inclusive communities.

#### The capabilities approach

Rather than a narrow focus on human capital, we argue that the capabilities approach provides a foundation that would support individuals to realise their aspirations and live lives they have reason to value through more holistic understandings of vocational education, while at the same time supporting regional social and economic development (Moodie, 2012; Moodie et al., 2013; Wheelahan et al., 2015; Wheelahan & Moodie, 2016). The capabilities approach can be applied at the level of the system to consider the role of TAFE as the anchor of the vocational education system in Australia, and at the level of curriculum to consider how curriculum can support individuals to gain knowledge and skills for their careers and not a narrow job, and help them to be active and contributing citizens.

The capabilities approach can be used to evaluate the outcomes of policies and the extent to which they provide individuals with fair access to opportunities. Rather than equality of resources, the capabilities approach focuses on equality of access to opportunities, and it is premised on the notion that some groups will require more access to resources than others to have the same sort of opportunities; for example, those with disabilities or from



disadvantaged communities will require more access to resources to have the same kinds of opportunities as those who are from more privileged backgrounds (Burchardt, 2004).

The capabilities approach emphasises the holistic development of the person, and not just their productive potential as workers. It has the potential to contribute to the conceptual basis of qualifications because its emphasis is on the development of the person and not just skills. Bonvin and Farvague (2006: 128) explain that "the capability approach is not reduced to issues related to work. It entails a broader view of the agency dimension, combining capability for work and capability for life." It is not possible for an individual to exercise skill at work unless they have the broader knowledge and skills needed to navigate their lives and work. Moreover, it is not possible for them to act as a citizen within their occupation who contributes to the development of their occupation and its place in society without a broader understanding of their field of practice, the knowledge base of practice and how their occupation contributes to society. The implications of this are that qualifications must go beyond preparation for narrow skills in specific jobs, but focus on the development of the person in the context of the broad occupation for which they are being prepared. It also implies that a one-size model of qualifications for all broad fields of practice and occupations will not be appropriate if they are to be contextually responsive to the specific needs of fields of practice, geographic regions, communities and individuals.

Crucially for vocational education, it entails a move away from current narrow human capital approaches that focus on investing in specific skills needed for work, to a broader conception of developing human potential. It is concerned with the notion of human flourishing and the broad social, economic, cultural and technological resources that are needed to support that. The capabilities approach has a different starting point to human capital approaches, as Sen (2007: 99) explains:

At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the literature on human capital tends to concentrate on the agency of human beings in augmenting production possibilities. The perspective of human capability focuses, on the other hand, on the ability – the substantive freedom – of people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have. The two perspectives cannot but be related, since both are concerned with the role of human beings, and in particular with the actual abilities that they achieve and acquire. But the yardstick of assessment concentrates on different achievements.

There are three aspects to the capabilities approach: they are capabilities, functionings and agency (Bryson, 2015). Sen (1993: 31) distinguishes between functionings and capabilities in this way:

Functionings represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings

### the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection.

Two people with similar capability sets may make choices that result in different functionings or outcomes. Walker and Unterhalter (2007: 4) explain that: "The difference between a capability and functioning is one between an opportunity to achieve and the actual achievement, between potential and outcome". Capabilities are about potential, because they comprise the individual (internal and external), social and environmental resources that individuals can use in undertaking a course of action or achieving an outcome they have reason to value. Agency matters because individuals must be able to make choices between different combinations of functionings – to choose one direction and not another (Bryson, 2015).

There are important caveats in understanding the way in which the capabilities approach can be used. First, it does not provide policy prescriptions on system design, policy and funding (Tikly, 2013). Instead, as Tikly (2013: 22) explains, it "should be seen as a way of framing issues and as a starting point for evaluating policy choices". It provides the tools for evaluating the justness of particular policies and for evaluating outcomes (Robeyns, 2005). Second, it doesn't substitute for research that seeks to understand the causes of disadvantage and inequality (Sayer, 2012). It is important to understand the different causes of disadvantage and discrimination so that contextually specific approaches can be implemented, and this requires teachers and education support workers who are highly skilled at understanding these needs, and TAFEs that are well resourced to support these students. Third, capability doesn't just depend on what the individual has learnt, knows or is able to do. The extent to which individuals are able to exercise choice and agency depends on the extent to which their communities and workplaces support them in doing so. While the capabilities approach may provide the basis for renovating vocational education qualifications so that they are more holistic and developmental, capabilities cannot compensate for workplaces that are racist, sexist, hierarchical and authoritarian. Fourth, the capabilities approach can't provide prescriptions for curriculum. The nature of curriculum will depend on the broad occupational field – or vocational stream – for which individuals are being prepared.

#### **Productive capabilities**

Following Sen's (1999) and Nussbaum's (2000) understanding of capabilities as peoples' ability to be and do what they have reason to value, we define a person's *productive capabilities* as what they can be and can do *in work* which they have reason to value. We understand work to be an activity which seeks to sustain an individual or society. This includes paid employment, voluntary work, and 'women's work', or 'self-provisioning within the household' as Pahl (1984) calls it, and excludes recreation and leisure (Voss, 1967).

We apply human capabilities to vocational education by considering what people are able to 'be and do' at work and through work to realise themselves and their goals. We



understand productive capabilities to refer to the resources and arrangements of work and the broad knowledge, skills and attributes that individuals need to be productive at work, to progress in their careers, and to participate in decision-making about work (Moodie, Wheelahan, Fredman, & Bexley, 2015). Vocational education students need to understand how their field of practice fits within their communities and societies, and they require the capacity to be 'citizens' within their broad occupational field, so they can help shape its future.

Productive capabilities are not generic skills or employability skills. Generic skills and employability skills are often suggested as a way of accommodating the fact that there is a very loose relationship between qualifications and jobs, with most people working in a different occupation than that associated with their qualification. However, arguably, neither approach breaks loose of the competency-based training approach which takes an atomistic approach to the specification of skill and separates it both from the body of knowledge upon which it depends, and the bodies of the people who must exercise skills. Generic and employability skills are underpinned by human capital assumptions about the nature of skills. Vocational qualifications based on generic skills or employability skills are arguably a watered down (and ultimately lower status) version of academic qualifications, and do not orient individuals to the fields of practice in which they will work.

Moreover, the loose links between qualifications and jobs are a function of the labour market and the way employers use qualifications to select candidates for jobs. The links between jobs and qualifications are loosest in unregulated occupations where the level of the qualification matters more for employers as a proxy for the kinds of abilities candidates have, rather than the specific content of a qualification. This is one reason why those with degrees have better labour market outcomes than those with diplomas (Karmel, 2015). As an illustration of this general point, an employer may specify they want someone with quantitative or research skills, but a range of qualifications may be sufficient, rather than one specific qualification. And, they may regard a degree as a better proxy for someone having these skills than a diploma. In contrast, in regulated occupations where professional and occupational bodies have had high levels of input into the specification of qualifications, it is necessary to have a particular qualification as a condition of getting a job in a regulated occupation (for example, nursing) (Moodie et al., 2015; Wheelahan et al., 2015; Wheelahan, Moodie, & Buchanan, 2012). Generic skills and employability skills will not overcome the way in which employers use qualifications to select candidates for jobs in unregulated occupations.

# Productive capabilities as a basis for vocational education policy

Productive capabilities provides a framework for considering the nature of curriculum and the purposes of qualifications through the notions of vocations and vocational streams, and for considering issues of system design through the notion of anchor institutions, with TAFE as the anchor of vocational education in Australia.

#### Vocational streams and the role of qualifications

Rather than prepare students for specific workplace tasks and roles associated with particular jobs, vocational education should instead prepare them for a broadly defined occupation or a vocational stream. Standing (2010, 13) explains that "Whereas an occupation is commonly defined by a career structure, a job has none." Training for a job is limited to the requirements of the job, whereas education or training for an occupation is premised on the notion of development and progression so that educational and occupational progression are linked.

Productive capabilities relates the conditions individuals need to engage in work and to progress through a career with the requirements of broad occupations. It focuses on what people need to be able to do to exercise complex judgements at work and what they need to be able to do in the future, rather than on workplace tasks and roles that have been defined for them or based on existing or past practice. This approach recognises the diffuse study and employment destinations of vocational education graduates, while also recognising that we need to enrich vocational qualifications by recognising the depth and complexity of vocational knowledge, as this is a core component of capability.

Vocational streams refers to the structure of occupations that share commonalities in knowledge, skills and practices, whereas vocations refers to the nature of practice (Buchanan, 2006; Moodie et al., 2013; Wheelahan et al., 2015; Wheelahan et al., 2012). An example of a vocational stream is care work; this links different occupations in care work such as those in aged care, disability care and mental health support, whereas the knowledge, skills and practices that workers engage in refers to the vocation. Vocational streams are based on identifying the nature of the skills ecosystems within which occupations are located and the communities that underpin them (Buchanan, 2006), while vocations are identified by analysis of the nature of practice and the knowledge and skills that underpin those practices.

The curricular implications are threefold: first, preparing people for a broad vocational stream goes beyond specific narrow skills and must support the holistic development of individuals. Second, preparation for work goes beyond preparing individuals for jobs, and focuses instead on preparing them for careers and ensuring they have the knowledge and skills they need to contribute to those careers. A career is defined by a broad vocational stream (Yu, Bretherton, & Buchanan, 2013; Yu, Bretherton, & Schutz, 2012). Third, there



is no one size fits all approach to curriculum or to qualifications; these will depend on the broad field of practice for which people are being prepared, and this will differ depending on whether individuals are being prepared for regulated occupations which have a tight connection to their intended occupation, or for unregulated occupations (which are the majority of the labour market) where these links are very loose.

This has implications for the broad purposes of vocational education and of curriculum. If curriculum to be holistic, then the aim must be for individuals to make real choices in their lives. The consequence is, as Schröer (2015) explains, that there are three categories of capabilities support which people to make real choices in their lives:

- capability for education, which refers to "the real freedom to choose a training program or a curriculum one has reason to value";
- capability for *work*, which refers to "the real freedom of making the choice to undertake the job or activity one has reason to value"; and
- capability for voice, which refers to "the real freedom to express one's wishes, expectations, desires etc. and make them count when decisions concerning oneself are made" (Schröer, 2015: 369).

These suggest three roles for all tertiary education qualifications, although the emphasis on each role may differ with each qualification (Gallacher, Ingram, & Reeve, 2012, 383; Moodie et al., 2013, 30):

- In the *labour market*: Qualifications provide entry to and progression in the workforce.
- 2. In *education*: All qualifications should provide students with the knowledge and skills they need to study at a higher level in their field or a closely related field.
- 3. In society: Qualifications contribute to society by developing students' appreciation of and contribution to culture and society. They develop individuals' capacity to contribute to their families, communities and occupations. Qualifications also contribute to social inclusion by supporting inclusion in education and the labour market, and by contributing to a more tolerant and inclusive society.

However, the way that qualifications play these three roles will differ depending on whether qualifications are preparing students for regulated or unregulated occupations. While it might be expected that qualifications for regulated occupations would emphasise the knowledge and skills needed for the occupation, qualifications for unregulated occupations would need to emphasise the educational purposes of qualifications because graduates need to be supported to engage in educational progression as a way of supporting occupational progression. Qualifications for regulated and unregulated occupations each would include and support the third purpose of qualifications – preparing people to become citizens in their occupational field as well as in society, although they will have done so in different ways.

## TAFEs as anchor institutions of their communities, industries and regions

TAFE's role in underpinning vocational education is fundamental, and the key to building a new social settlement. It is the 'local actor' (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006) which can link social partners (particularly those that support the most disadvantaged communities) and develop locally responsive approaches that meet the needs of their students, communities, and industries. Because TAFEs are deeply enmeshed in their local communities and regions, they will be a key institution contributing to renewal through sustainable and socially inclusive regional social and economic development.

If TAFE is to support its communities, then it needs to be funded to offer a sufficiently comprehensive range of programs that will enable students to realise their aspirations. This is a key implication of the capabilities approach in ensuring that individuals have capabilities for work, education, and voice (Bonvin, 2012). A particularly pernicious consequence of existing policies is that students who go to TAFE can only get public funding for their studies for courses in areas in which employers claim there are skill shortages. In contrast, students who can afford to go to university can choose anything they want. Moreover, the current policy of funding only programs deemed to support occupations 'in demand' in the labour market is misguided because, as we have seen, most people do not end up working in those occupations if they are working in unregulated occupations.

TAFEs don't just respond to 'demand' for skills; they are key local institutions which have responsibility for working with local communities and industries to develop solutions to problems and to creating opportunity. This requires funding for TAFE as an institution rather than specific programs. Instead, TAFEs should be trusted to work with their local industries and communities to develop qualifications that meet their needs. This is a role that TAFE has traditionally played; senior staff are members of local regional economic and social development committees, and teachers and education support workers work with disadvantaged communities and local industries to construct programs that suit their needs. Funding cutbacks have devastated TAFE's ability to undertake this kind of work, yet it is fundamental to the infrastructure of communities. This is why damage to TAFE is also damage to local communities. The decimation of TAFE is the decimation of local community infrastructures. Rebuilding TAFE's capacity to undertake this kind of work will require rebuilding the capacity of TAFE to undertake curriculum development, and providing the staffing it will need to form partnerships with, and engage their local communities.

TAFE's role would need to be supported and underpinned by appropriate national bodies that seek to develop vocational education, support and nurture communities of trust, and build links between TAFE and key industry bodies while supporting TAFE's involvement with its local industries. Any national body would need to have as a key principal that TAFE is a valued and important part of the national governance and quality assurance frameworks rather than a problem to be policed.



TAFE should, within a national quality assurance framework, be entrusted with developing local qualifications that meet the needs of students, communities, local industries and regions. Training packages are now 20 years old. They are a failed experiment and are not able to meet the needs of the future because they are bad qualifications based on bad models of curriculum that result in rigid, one size fits all qualifications for all Australia. We need a new model of qualifications, one that places the development of the student in the context of their broad intended occupation at the centre of curriculum and pedagogy.

But TAFE can do much more than this – TAFEs can be a powerhouse for local socially inclusive and sustainable social and economic development. Rather than limit its work to responding to existing requirements for skills, TAFEs need to be funded to consider the knowledge and skills that will be needed for work in the future, and to develop, codify and institutionalise this knowledge.

This is important scholarly activity that will support innovation, and it should explicitly be built into TAFE's mission. For example, the teachers of electrical trades apprentices should be supported to consider how the latest insights from engineering will change the work of electrical trades apprentices five or ten years in the future. Or, teachers of aged care workers should be supported to consider, and develop appropriate curriculum, to ensure that the aged care workers of tomorrow understand the implications of the latest research on dementia for working with elderly people with Alzheimer's.

Achieving these goals for TAFE will require investing in TAFE teachers and in TAFE teachers' qualifications. Strong institutions require well prepared, qualified staff. As well as being industry experts, TAFE teachers need to be supported to become expert teachers. Being an expert teacher in TAFE means something different to being an expert teacher in schools or universities. Expert teachers in TAFE should be able to engage in the scholarship of teaching and learning so they can consider the transformations to work in their field and what that will mean in the future, implement a repertoire of responsive pedagogic strategies to work with the most disadvantaged students, and support sustainable social and economic development and innovation in their communities.

TAFE is the anchor of its communities. It needs to be funded to support sustainable and socially inclusive social and economic development. It can work in partnership with schools and universities to achieve these goals, based on an understanding of its distinctive contributions and locally responsive and locally focused missions.

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## **Appendices**

The following tables and figures provide detailed information about funding of the Australian VET system, and about funded provision in Australia as a whole, and in each state and territory.

# Appendix 1: Changes in public funding per hour, and jurisdictional comparison

Table 2 shows total recurrent government expenditure per annual hour of training from 2008 to 2016 (in 2016 Australian dollars). 2008 was chosen as the reference year to commence the analysis because it was the that the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments signed the *National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development* (Council of Australian Governments, 2008), which introduced much greater contestability within the vocational education system. Table 2 shows that funding per hour of training in Australia has consistently declined since 2008 overall, and particularly in Australia, Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory. The funding rate in New South Wales is artificially inflated because funding has not kept pace with the collapse in enrolments in that state (see Table 4).

Table 2. Total government recurrent expenditure per annual hour of training 2008 – 2016 (2016 Aus dollar)

|      | NSW   | Vic   | Qld   | WA    | SA    | Tas   | ACT   | NT    | Aust  |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 2016 | 18.00 | 11.79 | 15.07 | 16.72 | 16.47 | 19.98 | 23.03 | 23.12 | 15.29 |
| 2015 | 24.69 | 10.32 | 14.10 | 18.13 | 17.66 | 19.41 | 20.27 | 26.40 | 15.70 |
| 2014 | 15.52 | 9.55  | 14.83 | 17.18 | 16.10 | 19.69 | 19.07 | 23.47 | 13.47 |
| 2013 | 16.90 | 11.64 | 20.57 | 17.71 | 13.00 | 20.97 | 19.96 | 32.40 | 15.24 |
| 2012 | 15.01 | 12.94 | 18.06 | 17.34 | 13.07 | 17.02 | 21.02 | 27.34 | 14.95 |
| 2011 | 14.67 | 13.36 | 17.02 | 18.67 | 16.64 | 19.97 | 19.82 | 31.27 | 15.49 |
| 2010 | 14.84 | 14.44 | 18.30 | 16.09 | 17.76 | 20.52 | 23.35 | 30.12 | 16.02 |
| 2009 | 15.18 | 15.61 | 20.63 | 16.60 | 18.23 | 19.65 | 23.96 | 30.37 | 16.92 |
| 2008 | 15.91 | 16.66 | 20.52 | 16.69 | 18.36 | 18.72 | 26.47 | 33.04 | 17.50 |

Source: Table 5A.2 Part B, Chapter 5, Attachment Productivity Commission (2018)

Table 3 shows the percentage change in total government recurrent expenditure per annual hour from 2008. The years 2009 to 2016 are compared to 2008 funding levels. Overall, funding has fallen in Australia by 12.64% from 2008 to 2016 while it fell by 30% in the Northern Territory, 29.23% in Victoria, and 26.54% in Queensland. Funding in South Australia has been highly volatile reflecting the nature of marketisation policies at different times in that state, which would move funding rates quite quickly in response to perceptions about too much demand for various programs. It is difficult to understand how TAFE in any state could function under such circumstances. Similar fluctuations are seen in Victoria, where the funding rate per hour of training in 2014 was almost 43% lower than it was in 2008. The steady increase in the funding rate in Victoria since that time represents the new Labor government's re-investment in TAFE, but it is still worthwhile noting that the funding rate in 2016 was still 29% lower than it was in 2008 in that state.



Table 3. Percentage change in total government recurrent expenditure per annual hour 2008 - 2016

|      | NSW   | Vic    | Qld    | WA    | SA     | Tas   | ACT    | NT     | Aust   |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| 2016 | 13.10 | -29.23 | -26.54 | 0.19  | -10.28 | 6.73  | -13.02 | -30.01 | -12.64 |
| 2015 | 55.17 | -38.07 | -31.26 | 8.62  | -3.78  | 3.71  | -23.44 | -20.07 | -10.28 |
| 2014 | -2.46 | -42.68 | -27.72 | 2.94  | -12.30 | 5.19  | -27.96 | -28.95 | -23.05 |
| 2013 | 6.18  | -30.10 | 0.25   | 6.12  | -29.16 | 12.03 | -24.62 | -1.92  | -12.90 |
| 2012 | -5.66 | -22.29 | -12.00 | 3.88  | -28.83 | -9.04 | -20.60 | -17.25 | -14.58 |
| 2011 | -7.85 | -19.76 | -17.03 | 11.90 | -9.38  | 6.68  | -25.13 | -5.34  | -11.47 |
| 2010 | -6.74 | -13.33 | -10.81 | -3.59 | -3.26  | 9.62  | -11.81 | -8.84  | -8.43  |
| 2009 | -4.62 | -6.28  | 0.56   | -0.54 | -0.70  | 4.98  | -9.49  | -8.08  | -3.28  |

Source: Derived from Table 5A.2 Part B, Chapter 5, Attachment Productivity Commission (2018)

Table 4 shows the number of publicly funded hours delivered in each state and territory and in Australia from 2008 to 2017. Again, 2008 was chosen as the first year to commence the analysis because it was the year in which the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments signed the National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development. We have used publicly funded delivery hours rather than student numbers or student enrolments because funding is tied to hours rather than students or enrolments. Table 4 shows that overall, while funded hours peaked during the years when VET FEE-HELP was rampant, that there has been a steep decline in recent years. Of particular note is New South Wales. It is the most populous state, but its enrolments have steadily declined, and it is now a smaller system than Victoria, and has been so since 2011.

Table 4. Australia: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 - 2017 (000,000 hours) by state/territory

|     | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| NSW | 119.4 | 123.7 | 130.2 | 133.2 | 136.0 | 122.9 | 125.0 | 80.4  | 102.1 | 101.5 |
| Vic | 92.4  | 98.8  | 114.3 | 147.3 | 188.0 | 185.8 | 184.9 | 157.6 | 129.8 | 117.7 |
| QLD | 51.3  | 54.6  | 62.0  | 69.6  | 64.6  | 56.3  | 67.2  | 74.7  | 70.4  | 67.1  |
| SA  | 21.0  | 23.6  | 24.2  | 26.3  | 32.2  | 42.2  | 29.1  | 23.3  | 19.0  | 16.2  |
| WA  | 35.6  | 40.3  | 43.5  | 44.6  | 44.4  | 44.2  | 41.6  | 40.7  | 38.7  | 38.1  |
| ACT | 5.4   | 6.1   | 6.5   | 6.6   | 6.4   | 6.1   | 5.8   | 5.5   | 5.2   | 4.9   |
| TAS | 7.6   | 7.4   | 8.0   | 8.6   | 8.9   | 7.7   | 8.2   | 7.4   | 7.1   | 7.1   |
| NT  | 3.9   | 4.1   | 4.3   | 4.4   | 4.5   | 4.1   | 5.0   | 4.4   | 5.1   | 5.1   |
| Aus | 336.6 | 358.6 | 392.9 | 440.7 | 485.0 | 469.3 | 466.8 | 393.9 | 377.4 | 357.6 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

Table 5 represents the same data as in Table 4, but as percentages rather than numbers of hours of training.


Table 5: Australia: Percentage share of publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours) by state/territory

|     | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| NSW | 35.5  | 34.5  | 33.1  | 30.2  | 28.0  | 26.2  | 26.8  | 20.4  | 27.1  | 28.4  |
| Vic | 27.4  | 27.5  | 29.1  | 33.4  | 38.8  | 39.6  | 39.6  | 40.0  | 34.4  | 32.9  |
| QLD | 15.2  | 15.2  | 15.8  | 15.8  | 13.3  | 12.0  | 14.4  | 19.0  | 18.6  | 18.8  |
| SA  | 6.2   | 6.6   | 6.1   | 6.0   | 6.6   | 9.0   | 6.2   | 5.9   | 5.0   | 4.5   |
| WA  | 10.6  | 11.2  | 11.1  | 10.1  | 9.2   | 9.4   | 8.9   | 10.3  | 10.3  | 10.7  |
| ACT | 1.6   | 1.7   | 1.6   | 1.5   | 1.3   | 1.3   | 1.3   | 1.4   | 1.4   | 1.4   |
| TAS | 2.3   | 2.1   | 2.0   | 2.0   | 1.8   | 1.6   | 1.8   | 1.9   | 1.9   | 2.0   |
| NT  | 1.2   | 1.1   | 1.1   | 1.0   | 0.9   | 0.9   | 1.1   | 1.1   | 1.3   | 1.4   |
| Aus | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Figure 11 and Figure 12 shows the same information as in Table 4, but in somewhat different ways. Figure 11 shows the shape of the system in Australia, whereas Figure 12 provides a clearer picture of changes in each state and territory each in absolute terms, and relative to each other.

Figure 11. Share of publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours) by state/territory






Figure 12. Share of publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours) by state/territory

Table 6 provides shows publicly funded enrolments in higher education. In contrast to the tumultuous growth and decline of publicly funded hours in vocational education, the introduction of the demand driven system in higher education in 2009 has resulted in massive growth in publicly funded under-graduate places in public universities. There are 40 Australian universities (including Bond University which is a small private university, and Notre Dame which is a relatively small private university but has publicly funded under-graduate places in some disciplines), two small overseas universities, and one small Australian university of specialisation.

| Table 6. All domestic u/g students Equivalent Full-time Student |
|---|
| Load in higher education from 2008 - 2016                       |


|           | 2008    | 2009    | 2010    | 2011    | 2012    | 2013    | 2014    | 2015    | 2016    |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| All       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| domestic  | 447,237 | 470,522 | 496,817 | 512,491 | 537,971 | 563,781 | 581,583 | 592,829 | 599,396 |
| u/g EFTSL |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| % change  |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| 2008 -    |         | 5.2%    | 11.1%   | 14.6%   | 20.3%   | 26.1%   | 30.0%   | 32.6%   | 34.0%   |
| 2016      |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |

Source: Department Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010) Students 2009 full year, <a href="http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx">http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx</a>
Table 4.2: Actual student load (EFTSL) for all domestic students by State, higher education provider and broad level of course, full year, 2009, and corresponding tables for subsequent years.

The higher education data reported in Table 6 are based on domestic under-graduate Equivalent Full-time Student Load in higher education, which is the unit of funding in higher education, and thus comparable to publicly funded hours in vocational education. These data here in Table 6 also include students attending under-graduate programs in non-university providers and private universities, however, their numbers overall are very small, accounting for about 3.6% of EFTs enrolled in bachelor degrees in 2016 (Department of Education and Training, 2017, derived from Table 4.2), so they are not likely overly skew the results.

Figure 13 shows the change in student enrolments in bachelor degrees in higher education reported as a percentage increase from 2009 to 2016, which was the last year full data were available.

Figure 13. Percentage increase in all domestic u/g student EFTSL in higher education from 2008 – 2016, using 2008 as the comparator year



Source: Department Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010) Students 2009 full year, http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/2009FullYear.aspx
Table 4.2: Actual student load (EFTSL) for all domestic students by State, higher education provider and broad level of course, full year, 2009, and corresponding tables for subsequent years.



#### **Appendix 2: Australia**

Table 7 shows the relative share of publicly funded delivery hours in vocational education in Australia from 2008 until 2017. These data are presented as percentage shares in Table 8. It shows that in 2008, TAFE's share of publicly funded hours was almost 82%, but this had fallen to 57% in 2017 (which was a small recovery compared to 50% in 2015 and 54% in 2016). In contrast, the share of the Adult and Community Education sector was similar in 2017 compared to 2008, although its share of training hours fluctuated over that time, but from a relatively small base. As will become apparent in later tables, not all states and territories have a separate adult and community education sector, or provide it with publicly funded vocational education hours. In contrast, the share of publicly funded hours held by private providers increased massively over the same time. Table 8 shows that the share of publicly funded hours held by private providers rose from almost 14% in 2008 to almost 39% in 2017 (which represented a fall since 2015, when private providers had almost 46% of all publicly funded enrolments).

Table 7. Australia: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours)

| Aus   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 275.8 | 291.7 | 300.1 | 298.8 | 311.4 | 297.4 | 261.6 | 198.3 | 204.1 | 205.3 |
| ACE   | 14.8  | 13.2  | 14.0  | 15.5  | 18.1  | 16.5  | 16.9  | 15.0  | 15.6  | 14.8  |
| PPs   | 46.0  | 53.7  | 78.9  | 126.3 | 155.5 | 155.3 | 188.3 | 180.5 | 157.6 | 137.6 |
| Total | 336.6 | 358.6 | 392.9 | 440.7 | 485.0 | 469.3 | 466.8 | 393.9 | 377.4 | 357.6 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers

Table 8. Australia: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| Aus   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 81.9  | 81.3  | 76.4  | 67.8  | 64.2  | 63.4  | 56.0  | 50.3  | 54.1  | 57.4  |
| ACE   | 4.4   | 3.7   | 3.6   | 3.5   | 3.7   | 3.5   | 3.6   | 3.8   | 4.1   | 4.1   |
| PPs   | 13.7  | 15.0  | 20.1  | 28.7  | 32.1  | 33.1  | 40.3  | 45.8  | 41.8  | 38.5  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 9 shows the change in publicly funded training hours in TAFE, adult and community education, and private providers, using 2008 as the comparison year. It shows that publicly funded hours fell in TAFE by almost 26% from 2008 to 2017, while they rose by 199% in private providers. Private providers' number of publicly funded hours grew by a massive 309% from 2008 to 2014, and subsequently 'dropped' to a 199% increase by 2017.


Table 9: Australia: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| Aus   | 2008 | 2009  | 2010 | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | 5.8   | 8.8  | 8.3   | 12.9  | 7.8   | -5.1  | -28.1 | -26.0 | -25.6 |
| ACE   | 0    | -10.8 | -5.5 | 5.3   | 22.6  | 12.1  | 14.3  | 1.9   | 5.9   | 0.2   |
| PPs   | 0    | 16.8  | 71.4 | 174.5 | 237.9 | 237.6 | 309.3 | 292.3 | 242.6 | 199.0 |
| Total | 0    | 6.5   | 16.7 | 30.9  | 44.1  | 39.4  | 38.7  | 17.0  | 12.1  | 6.3   |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Figure 14 shows the same data as in Table 7, but in the form of a bar chart. This shows the overall shape of the system from 2008 to 2017. It shows the rise and decline in the number of publicly funded hours, and it shows the change in composition of the system with private providers massively increasing their share of publicly funded hours, while TAFE's share declined markedly.

Figure 14. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Australia



TAFES TAFES and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers

Figure 15 shows the percentage change in provider share of publicly funded hours from 2008 to 2017, using 2008 as the comparator year. It shows the massive increases in the number of publicly funded training hours held by private providers, and the decline in TAFE's funded hours in that time. This is a representation of the same data as in Table 9.

Figure 16 shows the same data as in Table 8. It shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type. Again, it shows the redistribution of publicly funded hours



to private providers.

Figure 15. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Australia, 2008 as comparator year





Figure 16. Australia: Percentage share of Publicly Funded Hours of Training by Provider Type, 2008 - 2017



#### **Appendix 3: New South Wales**

Table 10 shows the number of publicly funded hours in New South Wales from 2008 to 2017 held by TAFE, adult and community education, and private providers. It shows a steady decline in TAFE and in ACE, while private providers hours have increased during that time. Table 11 shows the percentage share held by each type of provider from 2008 to 2017. It shows that TAFE's share declined from almost 87% of publicly funded hours in 2008, to 74% in 2017, while private providers more than doubled their share of publicly funded hours in that time. However, Table 12 shows that the number of publicly funded hours delivered by TAFEs from 2008 to 2018 fell by 27%, while they fell in ACE by 43%. In contrast, the number of publicly funded hours in private providers grew by 111% in that time. The overall effect of these fluctuations was that the number of hours delivered by the publicly funded system (regardless of provider), fell by 15% from 2008 to 2017.

Table 10. New South Wales: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours)

| NSW   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015 | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 103.8 | 109.5 | 111.1 | 110.3 | 114.6 | 107.1 | 105.6 | 66.5 | 78.1  | 75.4  |
| ACE   | 4.4   | 4.1   | 4.4   | 4.3   | 4.3   | 3.5   | 3.6   | 2.2  | 2.8   | 2.5   |
| PPs   | 11.2  | 10.1  | 14.8  | 18.7  | 17.1  | 12.4  | 15.7  | 11.7 | 21.3  | 23.6  |
| Total | 119.4 | 123.7 | 130.2 | 133.2 | 136.0 | 122.9 | 125.0 | 80.4 | 102.1 | 101.5 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

Table 11. NSW: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| NSW   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 86.9  | 88.5  | 85.3  | 82.8  | 84.3  | 87.1  | 84.5  | 82.7  | 76.5  | 74.3  |
| ACE   | 3.7   | 3.3   | 3.4   | 3.2   | 3.2   | 2.8   | 2.9   | 2.7   | 2.7   | 2.5   |
| PPs   | 9.4   | 8.1   | 11.3  | 14.0  | 12.6  | 10.1  | 12.6  | 14.6  | 20.8  | 23.2  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 12. NSW: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| NSW   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | 5.5  | 7.0  | 6.2  | 10.4 | 3.2   | 1.7   | -36.0 | -24.8 | -27.4 |
| ACE   | 0    | -7.5 | -1.4 | -3.9 | -3.3 | -21.9 | -17.9 | -50.4 | -37.3 | -43.4 |
| PPs   | 0    | -9.8 | 32.2 | 67.1 | 52.9 | 10.5  | 40.8  | 4.8   | 90.2  | 111.1 |
| Total | 0    | 3.6  | 9.0  | 11.5 | 13.8 | 2.9   | 4.6   | -32.7 | -14.5 | -15.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)



Figure 17 shows the same data as in Table 10. It shows the overall decline of the system, and the fall in TAFE's hours and the increase in private providers' hours.




Figure 17. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: NSW

Figure 18 the same data as in Table 12. It shows the growth in the number of hours in private providers, and the percentage fall in the number of publicly funded hours in TAFE and in ACE.




Figure 18. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: New South Wales, 2008 as comparator year

#### **Appendix 4: Victoria**

Table 13 shows the number of publicly funded hours of delivery in vocational education in TAFE, adult and community education and private providers in every year from 2008 to 2017. The magnitude of these changes are clearer in Table 14 and Table 15. Table 14 shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours held by TAFE, ACE and private providers from 2008 to 2017. It shows that TAFE's share fell from 76% in 2008 to almost 50% in 2017. This represents a recovery from 2015, where TAFE's share of publicly funded hours was about 36%. In contrast, as is illustrated in Table 14, the share of publicly funded hours held by private providers grew from 14% in 2008 to almost 42% in 2017. In 2014 and 2015, private providers share of publicly funded hours was 57%.

Table 13. Victoria: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours)

| VIC   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 70.6 | 76.7 | 80.7  | 79.6  | 87.5  | 84.2  | 67.7  | 56.4  | 54.6  | 58.2  |
| ACE   | 8.7  | 7.3  | 7.6   | 9.3   | 12.0  | 12.1  | 11.8  | 11.6  | 10.9  | 10.2  |
| PPs   | 13.1 | 14.9 | 25.9  | 58.4  | 88.5  | 89.5  | 105.4 | 89.5  | 64.4  | 49.2  |
| Total | 92.4 | 98.8 | 114.3 | 147.3 | 188.0 | 185.8 | 184.9 | 157.6 | 129.8 | 117.7 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education
PPs = Other registered providers

Table 14. Victoria: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| VIC   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 76.4  | 77.6  | 70.6  | 54.0  | 46.6  | 45.3  | 36.6  | 35.8  | 42.0  | 49.5  |
| ACE   | 9.4   | 7.3   | 6.7   | 6.3   | 6.4   | 6.5   | 6.4   | 7.4   | 8.4   | 8.7   |
| PPs   | 14.2  | 15.1  | 22.7  | 39.7  | 47.1  | 48.2  | 57.0  | 56.8  | 49.6  | 41.8  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 15 shows that the number of publicly funded hours delivered by TAFEs from 2008 to 2018 fell by 17.5%, while they grew in ACE by 17.5, although this is a relatively small component of the system. In contrast, the number of publicly funded hours in private providers grew by 276% in that time, after reaching 706% growth from 2008 to 2014. The overall effect of these fluctuations was that the number of hours delivered by the publicly funded system (regardless of provider), rose by 27% from 2008 to 2017.




Table 15. Victoria: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| VIC   | 2008 | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | 8.6   | 14.4  | 12.8  | 24.0  | 19.3  | -4.1  | -20.1 | -22.7 | -17.5 |
| ACE   | 0    | -16.6 | -12.1 | 6.6   | 37.3  | 38.5  | 35.8  | 33.8  | 25.1  | 17.5  |
| PPs   | 0    | 13.7  | 98.3  | 346.7 | 576.8 | 584.5 | 705.6 | 584.7 | 392.1 | 276.4 |
| Total | 0    | 7.0   | 23.7  | 59.5  | 103.5 | 101.2 | 100.1 | 70.6  | 40.5  | 27.4  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Figure 19 is a visual depiction of the data in Table 13. It shows the shape of the publicly funded system in Victoria, its rise and fall, and the radical recomposition of the share of publicly funded hours held by TAFE and private providers. Figure 20 is a visual representation of the data in Table 14. It shows the percentage change in the number of funded hours delivered by TAFE, ACE and private providers from 2008 to 2017, using 2008 as the comparator year.


Figure 19. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Victoria




TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers







#### **Appendix 5: Queensland**

The changes in TAFE's share of publicly funded hours in Queensland is among the most alarming in Australia. Table 16 shows the number of publicly funded hours of delivery in vocational education in TAFE, adult and community education and private providers in every year from 2008 to 2017. The magnitude of these changes are clearer in Table 17 and Table 18. Table 17 shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours held by TAFE, ACE and private providers from 2008 to 2017. It shows that TAFE's share fell from 82% in 2008 to almost 32% in 2017 (a slight recovery from 2015 and 2016 where it had 30% of publicly funded hours). In contrast, as is illustrated in Table 17, the share of publicly funded hours held by private providers grew from 16% in 2008 to almost 65% in 2017.

Table 16. Queensland: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 - 2017

| QLD   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 42.1 | 42.0 | 42.9 | 43.0 | 41.4 | 37.0 | 29.6 | 22.4 | 21.0 | 21.7 |
| ACE   | 0.9  | 1.2  | 1.4  | 1.4  | 1.4  | 0.5  | 1.0  | 0.8  | 1.5  | 1.6  |
| PPs   | 8.3  | 11.4 | 17.7 | 25.3 | 21.8 | 18.8 | 36.6 | 51.5 | 47.9 | 43.8 |
| Total | 51.3 | 54.6 | 62.0 | 69.6 | 64.6 | 56.3 | 67.2 | 74.7 | 70.4 | 67.1 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education
PPs Other registered providers

Table 17. Queensland: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| QLD   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 82.1  | 77.0  | 69.2  | 61.7  | 64.1  | 65.8  | 44.1  | 30.0  | 29.8  | 32.4  |
| ACE   | 1.8   | 2.2   | 2.3   | 2.0   | 2.1   | 0.9   | 1.4   | 1.0   | 2.1   | 2.3   |
| PPs   | 16.1  | 20.8  | 28.5  | 36.3  | 33.8  | 33.3  | 54.5  | 69.0  | 68.1  | 65.3  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 18. Queensland: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| QLD   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | -0.1 | 1.9   | 2.1   | -1.7  | -12.0 | -29.6 | -46.8 | -50.1 | -48.4 |
| ACE   | 0    | 25.8 | 51.4  | 48.3  | 46.5  | -47.3 | 1.6   | -17.7 | 56.5  | 64.4  |
| PPs   | 0    | 37.7 | 113.8 | 206.1 | 164.3 | 127.1 | 343.6 | 523.7 | 480.1 | 430.8 |
| Total | 0    | 6.5  | 20.8  | 35.8  | 25.9  | 9.7   | 31.1  | 45.5  | 37.2  | 30.8  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 18 presents an even more alarming picture. It shows that TAFE's publicly funded hours have fallen by 48% from 2008 to 2017, while they have risen by 431% in private providers in that time (after reading peak growth of 524% in 2015). ACE's enrolments show health growth, but they are a tiny component of the system.

Figure 21 shows the data in Table 16 in visual form. It shows the recomposition of the system to be dominated by private providers and the collapse in TAFE's share of publicly funded enrolments.

Figure 22 depicts the data in Table 18 in visual form. It shows the percentage change in the number of funded hours delivered by TAFE, ACE and private providers from 2008 to 2017, using 2008 as the comparator year.

This is not the first time that TAFE in Queensland has been in dire straits. In 1998, the Queensland government commissioned a report by Kim Bannikoff on the parlous state of TAFE in that state as a result of funding cuts and new administrative procedures. Bannikoff said at the time that: "The impact of these changes has been devastating. In the two years to June 1998 a combination of new and expensive administrative procedures, budget cuts and efficiency savings affected 47% of Institute budgets. These changes have hit the financial position of TAFE Institutes hard and at 30 June 1998, Institutes were not collectively viable" (Bannikoff, 1998, 4).

It seems that similar action may be required again.





Figure 21. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Queensland



Figure 22. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Queensland, 2008 as comparator year



### **Appendix 6: South Australia**

This set of tables is about South Australia. Table 19 shows the number of publicly funded hours of delivery in vocational education in TAFE, adult and community education and private providers in every year from 2008 to 2017. Public policy has been particularly volatile in South Australia, and this is reflected in the changes in the overall decline in the number of hours in the public system in South Australia. Table 20 shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours by TAFE, Adult and Community Education and private providers. It shows that TAFE's share of publicly funded hours fell from 74% in 2008 to 47% in 2014, before rising again to 68% in 2017. In contrast, private providers share of publicly funded hours was 24% in 2008, growing to 52% in 2014 while falling again to 30% in 2018. Table 21 shows the same sort of volatility in growth waxing and waning in the number of publicly funded hours in TAFE and private providers from 2008 to 2017. It shows that overall, TAFE's publicly funded hours fell by 29% from 2008 to 2017, while the number of publicly funded hours fell in private providers by 3%, after having grown by 300% from 2008 to 2013.

Table 19. South Australia: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 - 2017 (000,000 hours)

| SA    | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 15.5 | 16.8 | 16.9 | 16.2 | 18.7 | 21.6 | 13.7 | 12.5 | 11.9 | 11.0 |
| ACE   | 0.5  | 0.4  | 0.3  | 0.4  | 0.3  | 0.3  | 0.3  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.3  |
| PPs   | 5.1  | 6.3  | 7.0  | 9.7  | 13.2 | 20.2 | 15.1 | 10.5 | 6.9  | 4.9  |
| Total | 21.0 | 23.6 | 24.2 | 26.3 | 32.2 | 42.2 | 29.1 | 23.3 | 19.0 | 16.2 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education
PPs Other registered providers

Table 20. South Australia: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| SA    | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 73.8  | 71.4  | 69.8  | 61.6  | 58.2  | 51.3  | 47.2  | 53.7  | 62.6  | 67.9  |
| ACE   | 2.2   | 1.7   | 1.3   | 1.6   | 1.0   | 0.7   | 1.0   | 1.0   | 1.1   | 1.8   |
| PPs   | 24.0  | 26.8  | 29.0  | 36.8  | 40.9  | 47.9  | 51.8  | 45.3  | 36.2  | 30.3  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)




SA 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2009 2015 2017 **TAFES**  $\cap$ 86 8.6 44 20.7 39.4 -11.6 -19.5 -23.5-29.3 ACE ()-10.2 -33.7 -9.3 -32.1 -32.8 -36.6 -48.0 -53.3 -36.5 PPs ()25.1 38.4 91.4 160.4 299.9 198.6 108.4 36.0 -3.1 Total ()121 148 250 53.1 1004 384 106 -98 -23.1

Table 21. South Australia: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

This pattern of volatility is likely to continue. The recovery in TAFE's share of publicly funded hours from 2014 was in part because of alarm by the then Labor government in South Australia about what was happening to TAFE and it pulled back publicly funded hours to TAFE from private providers, while promising to reintroduce full contestability in the future, thus continuing its erratic policy zigzags. The current conservative government in South Australia which was elected in March 2018 has promised to reintroduce full contestability.

Figure 23 is a visual representation of the data in Table 19, showing the shape of the system overall, and the share of publicly funded hours by TAFE, ACE and private providers. Figure 22 is a visual representation of Table 21, and shows the percentage change in the number of publicly funded hours in TAFE, ACE and private providers from 2008 – 2017, with 2008 as the comparator year.







Figure 24. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: South Australia, 2008 as comparator year



TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers



#### **Appendix 7: Western Australia**

Table 22 shows the number of publicly funded hours in TAFE, adult and community education and private providers from 2008 to 2017. Table 23 shows the share of publicly funded hours held by each type of provider. It shows that TAFE's share of publicly funded hours fell from 87% in 2008 to 72% in 2017. In contrast, the share of publicly funded hours by private providers more than doubled in that time, from 12% in 2008 to 27% in 2017.

Table 22. Western Australia: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 - 2017 (000,000 hours)

| WA    | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 31.0 | 33.7 | 34.9 | 35.7 | 34.9 | 34.3 | 31.4 | 28.9 | 27.2 | 27.6 |
| ACE   | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.3  | 0.2  |
| PPs   | 4.3  | 6.4  | 8.4  | 8.7  | 9.3  | 9.7  | 10.0 | 11.6 | 11.3 | 10.4 |
| Total | 35.6 | 40.3 | 43.5 | 44.6 | 44.4 | 44.2 | 41.6 | 40.7 | 38.7 | 38.1 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education
PPs = Other registered providers

Table 23. Western Australia: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| WA    | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 87.2  | 83.7  | 80.1  | 80.1  | 78.6  | 77.7  | 75.6  | 71.0  | 70.1  | 72.2  |
| ACE   | 0.6   | 0.5   | 0.5   | 0.4   | 0.4   | 0.5   | 0.4   | 0.4   | 0.7   | 0.6   |
| PPs   | 12.2  | 15.9  | 19.4  | 19.5  | 21.0  | 21.8  | 24.0  | 28.6  | 29.2  | 27.2  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 24. Western Australia: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| WA    | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | 8.6  | 12.4 | 15.1  | 12.6  | 10.6  | 1.3   | -6.9  | -12.4 | -11.2 |
| ACE   | 0    | -9.9 | -8.5 | -17.8 | -27.2 | -0.4  | -25.0 | -17.5 | 25.0  | -3.9  |
| PPs   | 0    | 47.7 | 95.2 | 101.3 | 115.9 | 123.3 | 131.1 | 169.0 | 161.9 | 140.0 |
| Total | 0    | 13.3 | 22.4 | 25.4  | 24.9  | 24.2  | 16.9  | 14.4  | 9.0   | 7.3   |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 24 shows the percentage change of publicly funded hours in each type of provider from 2008 to 2017 with 2008 as the comparator year. It shows that TAFE's number of publicly funded hours fell be 11% in that time, while the number of publicly funded hours

grew in private providers by 140% in that time. At the level of the system, the number of publicly funded hours grew in Western Australia by 7% from 2008 to 2017.

Figure 25 is a visual representation of the data in Table 22 showing the overall shape of the system from 2008 to 2017, and the share of publicly funded hours by TAFE, ACE and private providers. Figure 26 is a visual representation of Table 24 showing the percentage change in the number of hours by TAFE and private providers from 2008 to 2017, with 2008 as the comparator year.

Figure 25. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Western Australia





Figure 26. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Western Australia, 2008 as comparator year





#### **Appendix 8: Tasmania**

Table 25 shows the share of publicly funded hours by TAFE and private providers in Tasmania from 2008 to 2017, while Table 26 shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours held by each. It shows that TAFE's share of publicly funded hours fell from 77% I 2008 to 65% in 2017. In contrast, the share of private providers grew from 21% in 2008 to 35% in 2017. Table 27 shows that the number of TAFE's publicly funded hours fell by 245 from 2008 to 2017, while the number of hours in private providers grew by 53%. It shows that overall, the system in Tasmania contracted by 7%.

Table 25. Tasmania: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours)

| Tas   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 6.0  | 5.6  | 6.2  | 6.7  | 6.8  | 5.8  | 5.7  | 4.8  | 4.7  | 4.6  |
| ACE   | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| PPs   | 1.6  | 1.8  | 1.8  | 1.9  | 2.1  | 1.8  | 2.6  | 2.6  | 2.3  | 2.5  |
| Total | 7.6  | 7.4  | 8.0  | 8.6  | 8.9  | 7.7  | 8.2  | 7.4  | 7.1  | 7.1  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education
PPs = Other registered providers

Table 26. Tasmania: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| Tas   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 78.6  | 75.6  | 77.1  | 77.9  | 76.5  | 76.0  | 68.6  | 64.9  | 67.1  | 64.8  |
| ACE   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   |
| PPs   | 21.4  | 24.4  | 22.9  | 22.1  | 23.5  | 24.0  | 31.4  | 35.1  | 32.9  | 35.2  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |


Source: NCVFR (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 27. Tasmania: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| Tas   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | -6.4 | 3.5  | 12.6 | 14.2 | -2.1 | -5.4 | -19.4 | -20.7 | -23.5 |
| ACE   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |       |       |
| PPs   | 0    | 10.9 | 12.7 | 17.1 | 28.8 | 13.6 | 59.1 | 60.0  | 42.6  | 52.7  |
| Total | 0    | -2.7 | 5.5  | 13.5 | 17.4 | 1.2  | 8.4  | -2.4  | -7.2  | -7.2  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Figure 27 is a visual representation of Table 25, showing the overall shape of the system from 2008 to 2017 and the relative share of publicly funded hours held by TAFE and private providers over that time. Figure 28 is a visual representation of Table 27, showing the percentage decline in the number of publicly funded hours held by TAFE and the percentage increase held by private providers.







Figure 28. Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Tasmania, 2008 as comparator year





### **Appendix 9: Northern Territory**

Table 28 shows the distribution of publicly funded hours of delivery held by TAFE and private providers, whereas Table 29 shows the percentage share held by each. It shows that in 2008, TAFE delivered 70% of publicly funded hours, but this had dropped to 61% in 2017. In contrast, the percentage share of private providers grew from 30% to 39% in that time. Table 30 shows that the number of hours delivered by TAFE grew by 14% from 2008 to 2017, while it grew by 74% for private providers in that time. Overall, the Northern Territory system grew by 32% from 2008 to 2017, in stark contrast to other states which experienced a decline. It is a small system, but vitally important for social inclusion and economic prosperity in the NT.

Table 28. Northern Territory: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 - 2017 (000,000 hours)

| NT    | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 2.7  | 2.7  | 2.6  | 2.7  | 2.7  | 2.7  | 3.1  | 2.8  | 3.1  | 3.1  |
| ACE   | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| PPs   | 1.2  | 1.4  | 1.7  | 1.7  | 1.8  | 1.4  | 1.9  | 1.6  | 2.0  | 2.0  |
| Total | 3.9  | 4.1  | 4.3  | 4.4  | 4.5  | 4.1  | 5.0  | 4.4  | 5.1  | 5.1  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers

Table 29. Northern Territory: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| NT    | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 70.3  | 66.0  | 60.1  | 61.1  | 60.4  | 66.1  | 62.9  | 63.4  | 60.8  | 60.7  |
| ACE   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   |
| PPs   | 29.7  | 34.0  | 39.9  | 38.9  | 39.6  | 33.9  | 37.1  | 36.6  | 39.2  | 39.3  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 30. Northern Territory: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| NT    | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 0    | -0.8 | -5.1 | -1.7 | 0.3  | -0.2 | 15.4 | 1.3  | 12.9 | 14.0 |
| ACE   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| PPs   | 0    | 21.1 | 49.0 | 47.9 | 55.7 | 20.8 | 61.2 | 38.4 | 72.3 | 74.3 |
| Total | 0    | 5.7  | 11.0 | 13.0 | 16.8 | 6.0  | 29.0 | 12.3 | 30.5 | 31.9 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Figure 29 is a visual representation of Table 28 showing the overall shape of the system and the relative share of TAFE and private providers, while Figure 30 is a visual representation of Table 30, showing the change in the percentage of the number of hours delivered by TAFE and private providers from 2008 to 2017, with 2008 as the comparator year.

Figure 29. Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Northern Territory





Figure 30: Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Northern Territory, 2008 as comparator year





### **Appendix 10:Australian Capital Territory**

Table 31 shows the number of publicly funded hours in the Australian Capital Territory overall, and the share held by TAFE and private providers. Table 32 shows the percentage share of publicly funded hours held by TAFE and private providers in that time. It shows that there has been some fluctuation from 2008 to 2017 in what is a very small system, so any change is likely to have a large effect. Table 33 shows that the percentage of publicly funded enrolments in TAFE fell by 9% from 2008 to 2017, while they fell by 14% in private providers, and 10% for the system overall. Figure 31 is a visual representation of Table 31, while Figure 32 is a visual representation of Table 33.

Table 31. Australian Capital Territory: Publicly funded delivery hours 2008 – 2017 (000,000 hours)

| ACT   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TAFEs | 4.1  | 4.6  | 4.9  | 4.6  | 4.7  | 4.5  | 4.8  | 4.1  | 3.6  | 3.7  |
| ACE   | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| PPs   | 1.3  | 1.5  | 1.5  | 2.0  | 1.7  | 1.6  | 1.1  | 1.4  | 1.6  | 1.2  |
| Total | 5.4  | 6.1  | 6.5  | 6.6  | 6.4  | 6.1  | 5.8  | 5.5  | 5.2  | 4.9  |

Source: NCVER (2018: Table 12)

TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers

Table 32. Australian Capital Territory: Percentage share of publicly funded hours by provider type, each year, 2008 - 2017

| ACT   | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 75.2  | 75.5  | 76.2  | 70.3  | 73.7  | 73.8  | 81.7  | 74.5  | 68.9  | 76.2  |
| ACE   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   |
| PPs   | 24.8  | 24.5  | 23.8  | 29.7  | 26.3  | 26.2  | 18.3  | 25.5  | 31.1  | 23.8  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)

Table 33. Australian Capital Territory: Percentage change in publicly funded hours 2008 – 2017 by provider type, 2008 as comparator year

| ACT   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014  | 2015 | 2016  | 2017  |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| TAFEs | 0    | 14.1 | 21.3 | 14.1 | 15.7 | 11.0 | 17.3  | 1.2  | -11.9 | -8.9  |
| ACE   |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |      |       |       |
| PPs   | 0    | 12.2 | 15.0 | 46.5 | 25.4 | 19.6 | -20.5 | 4.9  | 20.7  | -13.6 |
| Total | 0    | 13.6 | 19.7 | 22.1 | 18.1 | 13.2 | 8.0   | 2.1  | -3.8  | -10.1 |

Source: NCVER (2018: Derived from Table 12)





Figure 31: Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Australian Capital Territory

Figure 32: Percentage change in Publicly Funded Hours (000,000) of Training by Provider Type: Australia Capital Territory, 2008 as comparator year



TAFEs and other government providers

ACE Community education

PPs Other registered providers, mainly private providers



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### Case Study of TAFE and public vocational education in Australia Preliminary Report

Leesa Wheelahan, Gavin Moodie, Eric Lavigne and Fatima Samji

University of Toronto,

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

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#### Head office

5 bd du Roi Albert II 1210 Brussels, Belgium Tel +32-2 224 0611 headoffice@ei-ie.org

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